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    ABSTRACT 
 State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years 
because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many 
jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the 
current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of 
insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities 
for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a 
federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can 
be addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into 
insurance markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to 
provide for jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter 
insurers that could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter.  
This single-license approach addresses the most salient concerns of proponents of federal 
optional chartering. It also has the potential for triggering competition and innovation in 
insurance products and rates while preserving a meaningful role for state regulation.   
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State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years.1  
Many criticisms reflect the views of the insurance industry that inconsistent state 
regulations drive up costs because of the burden of compliance with multiple 
jurisdictions, limit product innovation and competition, and prevent companies from 
exiting jurisdictions that impose burdensome regulation. Under the current regulatory 
system, each state government is the monopoly insurance regulator within the state. 
Although the states exchange information through the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, state regulators' willingness and ability to experiment is constrained by 
the threat that the experiments might attract federal regulation.2   Thus, despite its 
appearance of being decentralized federalism, the current state-based regulatory system 
does not capture the benefits of jurisdictional competition that are found in other areas of 
the law, notably including corporate law.3   
The problems with state regulation and concerns about the competitiveness of 
U.S. insurers in global financial markets have led to pressure for a greater federal role in 
insurance regulation.4  Several proposals to federalize insurance regulation have been 
advanced.5  The most seriously considered proposal calls for optional federal chartering 
(OFC) of multi-state insurers.6 Although OFC was recently endorsed by the U.S. 
Department of Treasury,7  the insurance industry is divided in its support of OFC.8  All 
proposals to federalize insurance regulation share the defect of the current system of 
failing to take advantage of jurisdictional competition to generate a more efficient 
regulatory structure.  
This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be 
addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into insurance 
                                                          
1 See Peter J. Wallison, Introduction, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND THE 
REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES (Peter J. Wallison, ed., 2000) (hereinafter Wallison). 
2 See Scott E. Harrington, The History of Federal Involvement in Insurance Regulation, in 
Wallison, supra note 1, 27-37; Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds after the Advent of Federal 
Insurance Chartering, in Wallison, supra note 1, 135, 138. 
3 See Roberta Romano, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
4 See Robert C. Eager, Creating Federal Insurance Regulation: A Zero-Based Approach, in 
Wallison, supra note 1, 153, 153 (“… the growing sense that a federal platform for insurance is needed for 
competitive reasons in a national – indeed, international—marketplace.”).   
5 For a summary of current proposals to federalize insurance regulation, see Elizabeth F. Brown, 
The Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance Regulation, available on SSRN.  Paper Presented at 
Northwestern University School of Law’s Searle Center Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and 
Regulation, April 14 and 15, 2008. 
6 See Hal S. Scott, Optional Federal Chartering of Insurance: Design of a Regulatory Structure, 
Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 07-05, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=985579.  
Paper Presented at Northwestern University School of Law’s Searle Center Research Symposium on 
Insurance Markets and Regulation, April 14 and 15, 2008. 
7 The Department of The Treasury, Blueprint For a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 
(March 2008). 
8 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Insurers Are At Odds Over Paulson Plan: New Federal Overseer Favored 
Mainly by Large Companies, THE WASHINGTON POST, Saturday, April 19, 2008; Page D01. 
 3
A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance 
markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to provide for 
jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter insurers that 
could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter.  The single-
license solution has the potential for triggering competition and innovation on insurance 
products and rates while preserving a role for meaningful state regulation. 
Discussion proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief introduction to the 
rationale for insurance and history of insurance regulation and the criticisms of the 
current regulatory structure that have led to calls for federal intervention.   
Part II evaluates current proposals for federal involvement in insurance 
regulation.  In general, it shows that the promise of short-term cost savings could lead to 
long-term inefficiency both in the static sense of misguided regulation and the dynamic 
sense of the opportunity costs of forgoing the advantages of a competitive regulatory 
system.  
Part III proposes a jurisdictional competition approach to insurance regulation. 
Under the single-license proposal, states would be allowed to charter insurance 
companies that would be licensed to operate nationally.  Our proposal is based on letting 
firms choose their state regulator, which would facilitate jurisdictional competition 
without either the impediment of a federal competitor or exposing insurers to multiple 
regulators. Insurers could choose their chartering state, subject to federal minimum 
standards based on a market test for solvency.  They could also choose their preferred law 
to govern application and validity of their insurance policies, subject to limited state 
ability to override by legislation the application of the chartering state's law. The single-
license approach would permit a dynamic process for experimentation and improvement 
of insurance regulation that would improve the international competitiveness of 
American insurers, while at the same time ensuring the financial soundness of insurers 
and preserving a limited state ability to protect consumers.  The proposal calls for federal 
intervention only to the extent of ensuring that states allow nationwide operations with a 
single license, as well as allocation of taxing authority between the chartering state and 
the state of the insured.  
Part IV considers the potential for a residual federal role in providing substantive 
regulation. The federal government might mitigate any remaining possibility of a race to 
the bottom under the single-license approach, as well as protecting insurers from the 
threat of multiple state regulations.  However, any federal substantive regulation must be 
designed not to unduly undercut the benefits of viable state competition.   
I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
An understanding of the history and underlying economics of insurance regulation 
is essential to considering the direction this regulation should take.  This Part considers 
the rationale for regulation of insurance, what explains the current regulatory structure, 
and the problems with the current system.  
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A.  WHY REGULATE INSURANCE? 
Insurance regulation has two broad and intertwined functions – protection of 
consumers from unfair insurance contracts, and ensuring the safety and soundness of the 
companies themselves.9    
An important basis of consumer protection is the supposed information 
asymmetry between unsophisticated consumers and insurance companies. Insurance 
policies are classic adhesion-type contracts presented to consumers with little or no 
opportunity for bargaining over the terms.  They are presented in arcane language that 
consumers that even many lawyers have difficulty understanding.  It is accordingly 
difficulty or impossible for an individual consumer to meaningfully compare policies.   
This is complicated by the peculiarly contingent nature of insurance that seems to justify 
regulation. Consumers pay up front for the insurance company’s performance – coverage 
against risk – that is contingent on the occurrence of an often distant and unlikely event.  
Consumers may be unable to evaluate at the time they buy the policy their coverage for 
the risk that eventually occurs.  As a result, insurers have an incentive to overcharge for 
what turns out to be rather narrow coverage. 
Safety-and-soundness regulation involves the temporal nature of insurance that 
triggers a concern that the insurance company will not be able to pay when it is called 
upon to do so. Insurers have an incentive to charge low prices to attract customers in the 
short run though this may increase the likelihood of default when the claims come due.   
Thus, while consumer protection oriented regulators are worried about rates being too 
high for the amount of coverage, safety-and-soundness regulators are concerned about 
rates being too low to ensure the company will pay for covered risks. 
An additional challenge inherent in safety-and-soundness regulation concerns the 
link between this regulation and state guaranty funds that protect consumers by giving 
them a source of funds when insurers default.  These funds create a moral hazard by 
potentially reducing the insurance industry's incentive to guard against default.  Thus, as 
with federal deposit insurance, the existence of these state funds must be tied to state 
regulation of financial solvency.   
Despite these problems for consumers, there are significant arguments against 
strict regulation.  Many insurers sell their products in a vibrant competitive market. Even 
if many individual consumers do not have the time or expertise to track solvency or 
figure out policies, some do, and the size of the market justifies the entry of expert 
intermediaries.  Moreover, insurers' emphasis on standard-form contracts and pricing 
makes price discrimination difficult.  Accordingly, competition gives insurers an 
incentive to offer terms acceptable to the more sophisticated buyers.10 
Insurance, of course, is not the only financial service subject to regulation.  
Banking and securities are regulated as well.  Insurance arguably differs from other 
                                                          
9  See generally Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies: Options and 
Alternative for Transforming Insurance Regulation, Policy Brief, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana 
State University, 2006-PB-02 (March 2006).  
10 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
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financial services on several dimensions.  However, while we can define the current 
industry, there may be no economic reason for these borders to persist.  For example, 
consumers can protect against risks by investing as well as by insuring. An important 
goal of insurance regulatory reform could be to set up an institutional framework that 
allows financial markets and products to evolve in response to market forces.   
B.   THE STRUCTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION 
The tensions in the current regulatory structure have been present for at least 140 
years.  When insurance companies expanded across state lines during the middle of the 
nineteenth century, they sought federal regulation to relieve them from the burdens of 
complying with regulations in multiple jurisdictions.11  U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Paul v. Virginia12 halted this effort in 1868 by holding that insurance contracts were not 
interstate commerce.  However, the Supreme Court reversed course in 1944 in United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n13 where it held that insurance was interstate 
commerce and thus subject to federal antitrust regulation.   
Though insurers favored a single federal regulator of insurance prior to Paul v. 
Virginia, they changed their tune after South-Eastern Underwriters presented them with 
the specter of federal antitrust regulation.  Antitrust regulation threatens insurers' ability 
to enhance actuarial projections by cooperating through rating bureaus on the collection 
and dissemination of risk information.  The insurance industry was anxious to remove the 
potential antitrust threat but did not have enough clout to get the federal regulation it 
wanted. They therefore joined with the state regulators through the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) to obtain passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
of 1945.14  McCarran-Ferguson provided limited antitrust immunity for the insurance 
industry15 and established the states as the primary regulators of the insurance industry.16 
McCarran-Ferguson instituted an era of regulation through dispersed state 
regulators, made somewhat palatable to insurers by state cooperation through the NAIC.  
However, several insurer failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s cast doubt on the 
adequacy of state guaranty funds and triggered renewed interest in federal regulation of 
insurance.  Congress considered several proposals for federal chartering and regulation 
and the establishment of a federal guaranty fund.  The NAIC successfully fended off this 
incursion onto their turf by encouraging state regulators to enact their own risk-based 
capital requirements for insurers, modeled after federal risk-based capital requirements 
                                                          
11 See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999). 
12 75 U.S. 169 (1868). 
13 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
14 Ch. 20, §1, 59. Stat. 33 (1945)(codified 15 U.S.C.S. §1011 (2004)). 
15 For a discussion and policy analysis of McCarran-Ferguson, see Jonathan R. Macey and 
Geoffrey P. Miller, COSTLY POLICIES:  STATE REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN 
INSURANCE MARKETS (1993). 
16 See U.S.C.S. §§1011-1015 (“the business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall 
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation and taxation of such business.”). 
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for banks.  However, the equilibrium may be shifting toward an increased emphasis on 
federal regulation. 
The adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) is another significant 
development. GLB blurs traditional boundaries while at the same time maintaining 
existing formal distinctions in federal regulation of financial services.17  This uneasy 
situation increases the need for a system that erases artificial regulatory barriers.  
C. ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL REGULATION 
The whole idea of a state-based system for regulating insurance is now on the 
table.  This makes particularly salient the long-unsettled question of whether insurance 
really should be regulated by the states. There are obvious scale economies in the sale of 
insurance, particularly including the cost advantages of a large risk pool and of selling 
standard-form policies. Insurance is, therefore, a national business, which seems to 
require national regulation. 
The interstate nature of the insurance business casts doubt on the viability of 
state-based insurance regulation. Insurance companies operating in more than one state 
must comply with regulation in each state in which they sell insurance.  As long as states 
have the power to bar firms from selling in their states, insurers must pay a regulatory tax 
in order to enter state markets.  This gives states – particularly those like California with 
the most lucrative markets – the ability and incentive to impose inefficient regulation at 
the behest of local interest groups.  
The problems of state-based regulation of insurance are manifest. First, the idea 
that each state should be regulating the prices insurers charge is highly questionable. 
State regulators have incentives to suppress rates below the level that the market would 
bear in order to satisfy consumer groups. Rate regulation is a particularly easy target for 
proponents of federal preemption.18 
Second, insurers must get each state's regulatory approval of every policy they 
sell. The process itself is costly, as is insurers' inability to rely on uniform policies across 
the states in which they sell insurance. Among other things, states impose restrictions on 
insurers' underwriting and risk classification, which undercuts insurers' need to rely on 
national standards. 
Third, states impose a variety of consumer-protection rules insurers must comply 
with regardless of where the companies are chartered or based.  Unlike many types of 
contracts, insurance policies cannot effectively designate a single applicable law.  Under 
the most commonly applied test, a state can disregard the contractually designated state if 
the designated law is "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially 
                                                          
17 See Brown, supra note 5. 
18 See Wallison, supra note 1, at 10 (“The problem of  nonessential regulation suggests that there 
could be significant compliance-cost reductions in a federal chartering and regulatory system, if the federal 
authority were to reduce nonessential regulation and nonuniform state conduct regulation not beneficial to 
the public.”). 
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greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue."19 States 
have considerable leeway in determining whether these conditions are met.20   
All of this could be ameliorated to some extent if insurers could exit states that 
impose excessive burdens.  To be sure, as noted above, this is not a panacea for insurers 
since they would have to bear the penalty of losing sales in the state. But it would at least 
give insurers a stick they could hold over regulators, since consumers in the state would 
suffer from insurer exit.  The problem is that states also bar the doors by imposing 
restrictions on insurer exit – and they may impose these barriers only after the insurer has 
entered the state.21 
II. A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS 
This Part discusses proposals for a federal fix of the current system of insurance 
regulation.  Subpart A begins by sounding a general cautionary note about the advantages 
of a federal regulatory system.  Although such a system may yield short-term gains over 
the current approach, it may well have long-term costs. The appropriate institutional 
design is far more important than the substantive content of the regulation. The remainder 
of this Part critiques the specific proposals that are on the table in light of these general 
considerations.  
A. THE FALSE PROMISE OF FEDERAL REGULATION  
The economic case for federal insurance regulation appears overpowering in light 
of the overreaching and inefficiency of the current state system.  Calls for federal 
regulation are motivated by a desire to relieve the problems of duplication and 
overregulation that result from current allocation of regulation to the states.  Indeed, the 
calls for reform may have the even more short-term motivation of a justified fear of being 
subject to aggressive regulators in states like Mississippi22 and Florida.23 
However, in evaluating reform proposals it is easy to fall into the trap of 
overemphasizing short-term benefits from federal regulation that would remove the 
redundancies of the current state-based system.  State regulation has important but 
perhaps less apparent long-term dynamic benefits of creating an institutional structure 
                                                          
19 See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, §187(2) (1971).   
20 See O'Hara & Ribstein, THE LAW MARKET, Ch. 3 (forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press). 
21  See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 293 (1999). 
22  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood sought to prevent 
State Farm Insurance Co. from “refusing to write new homeowners and commercial policies.” In February, 
2007, Hood announced that he would seek new legislation premised upon Florida’s anti-cancellation 
measures, but going one step further.  His plan would force firms currently offering auto insurance in 
Mississippi, and homeowners insurance in other states, to “write new policies” for homeowners insurance 
in Mississippi.  This move was made in response to State Farm’s announcement that “it has had enough of 
the ‘untenable’ legal and political climate in the state and is suspending writing new homeowners and 
commercial policies.”  Associated Press, Miss. Official Seeks to Block State Farm, February 17, 2007, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17187629/.   
23 Tom Zucco, Allstate, Florida not backing off in insurance fight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Friday, April 18, 2008. 
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that encourages experimentation and regulatory evolution in response to changes in 
exogenous and endogenous forces.  In particular, a state-based system facilitates reversal 
of inevitable policy mistakes that can easily get locked in at the federal level.  Consider, 
for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a hastily adopted law that brought increased 
federalization of previously state-dominated corporation law.24 Almost from the moment 
of its enactment, Sarbanes-Oxley has caused huge costs and problems for publicly traded 
firms.  Yet there has still been no serious attempt to reform the legislation. Similarly, 
federal controls on interest rates outlasted their usefulness to the point that they 
bankrupted the entire savings and loan industry.  
It is far from clear that a large federal role is necessary, even given the problems 
of state regulation. The states have shown that they can respond to the need to modernize 
regulation to enable firms to compete in a global market.25  The major problem with the 
current system of insurance regulation that needs to be fixed is that it turns what could be 
the big advantage for the United States in the global market place – the "genius" of our 
federal system – into a significant disadvantage, where domestic firms are crippled by 
multiple state regulation and foreign firms are deterred from entering. Also, instead of 
encouraging regulatory experimentation and competition, the NAIC stifles 
experimentation by setting standards and model rules.   
The objective in reforming insurance regulation should be to fix the problems of 
state law without imposing the potential costs of federalizing insurance law.  
Understanding the need to preserve the dynamism of our federal system is far more 
important than trying to get the details of a regulatory fix exactly right for transitory 
current market conditions.  Our policy proposals in Part III deal with the problems of 
state regulation without throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
Large insurers may be skeptical of any approach that preserves state regulation. 
They may be convinced that they could more effectively control federal legislators and 
regulators than they can control legislators and regulators in fifty-one dispersed 
jurisdictions.  And state-based consumer protection groups may just want to maintain the 
regulatory status quo.  But federalization would introduce a new interest group dynamic 
that existing groups might find difficult to control. Many state-based consumer groups 
would be marginalized by a federal takeover of insurance regulation and replaced by new 
and more aggressive proponents of regulation. Under true jurisdictional competition, 
market forces could constrain and balance the often competing interests of insurers and 
consumer protectors.  By contrast, under a federal regime, insurers would be forced to 
deal with a single legislature and perhaps a single regulatory agency. They would 
therefore be vulnerable to repeated threats of regulation and attempts to extract rents,26 
with little ability to respond to the threat by exiting to another regime.  
Reform proponents also tend to overestimate the likelihood that their favored 
proposal will work as intended. The task of determining appropriate or optimal standards 
                                                          
24 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE (AEI 2006). 
25 See Harrington, supra note 2 at 27-37 (noting that periodic crises have forced individual states 
and the NAIC to make gradual moves toward modernizing the regulatory system.). 
26 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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under federal charters may appear simple and straightforward.  After all, state regulators 
and the NAIC have been promulgating rules and regulations for a long time.  Law 
professors and other experts may be so convinced they are right that they may find it 
difficult to believe that smart, well intentioned federal regulators could reach a different 
conclusion. However, reform of a complex system is immensely difficult to get right, 
even under the highly unrealistic assumption that current conditions will not change.  If 
conditions do change, today's panacea will become tomorrow's problem. Meaningful 
reform requires establishing a system that will reach the right solutions today and 
tomorrow.  
B.  THE TREASURY PLAN AND THE NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT:  
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING 
The recently-unveiled Treasury Plan is similar to the National Insurance Act of 
2007 and other legislative proposals that create a federal optional charter.27  For ease of 
exposition, the following discussion focuses on the Treasury Plan.  The Treasury Plan 
would give multi-state insurance companies the option of obtaining a federal charter that 
would allow them to operate throughout the country without regard to state licensing and 
entry restrictions.  The Treasury Plan would create a new Office of National Insurance 
(“ONI”) within the Treasury Department which would be headed by a Commissioner of 
National Insurance (“CNI”). The Treasury Plan would also establish an Office of 
Insurance Oversight (“OIO”) to (1) address international regulatory issues and (2) advise 
the Secretary on major domestic and international policy issues.  Nationally chartered 
insurers would be exempt from state rate regulations.   
OFC proposals are premised on the assumption that national regulators will 
provide more balanced and reasonable regulation than decentralized state regulators.  
Supporters of OFC argue that establishing an optional federal charter would not supplant 
state regulation or state premium taxation because OFC would allow insurers to choose 
between state and federal regulation.28   
                                                          
27 See Treasury Blueprint, supra note 7, at n. 110 (“Treasury recognizes that there are currently 
pending bills in both the House (H.R. 3200) and Senate (S. 40) entitled ‘National Insurance Act of 2007’ 
that would create an OFC and establish an ONI.  It is not Treasury’s intent at this time to opine on the 
details or merits of the pending legislation, but rather to set forth general guidelines as to the basics that it 
believes any ultimate legislation should contain in establishing an ONI and creating an OFC.  That said, 
there are many positive attributes to these bills as they address many of the concepts raised in this report.”). 
28 The OFC approach is often analogized to the dual banking regulatory structure.  See Eager, 
supra note 4, at 154 (“Political reality dictates that a federal charter be optional and create a dual state-
federal system.  That is desirable because … there is a real virtue to a system that fosters competition 
through choice.  The dual banking system is a relevant model and on the whole demonstrates the 
competitive and regulatory vitality of a dual system.”); U.S. Treasury Department of Public Affairs, Fact 
Sheet: Treasury Releases Blueprint for a Stronger Regulatory Structure (March 2008) (“This structure is 
similar to the current dual-chartering system for banking.”).  This analogy, however, should not convince 
anyone of the virtues of the optional charter. First, the virtues of the dual banking system are often 
overstated. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677 (1988). Second, the presence of federal deposit insurance (which is 
available to both federal and state banks) dramatically distorts the type of market pressures that could be 
created in a vibrant market for insurance charters.  For a discussion of one limited area where the dual 
banking system encouraged beneficial regulatory competition, see Henry N. Butler, The Competitive 
Equality Doctrine and the Demise of Intrastate Branching Restrictions, 55 TENN. L. REV. 703 (1988). 
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The central problem with OFC is that it preserves only the mirage of competition. 
The NIA would let multi-state insurers either choose a single federal charter or continue 
to be subject to multiple state regulators just as they are now.  Given the high costs of the 
state system, insurers would be highly likely to choose the federal charter.  Thus, OFC is 
likely to evolve into an all-federal system. Moreover, insurers would gain little from this 
"choice," as federal politicians could engage in "rent extraction" by threatening regulation 
up to the difference between the regulatory costs under the federal regime and those 
under the state regime.29 Thus, insurers could lose the benefit of the gains associated with 
opting into federal regulation plus the transaction costs of resubmitting to licensing in 
each state.   
One might wonder why this is so, since it would seem that insurers would 
recognize the risk of lock-in and rent extraction and just stay with the current system.  
But the drawback of that strategy lies in the very problem that is provoking calls for 
reform – the inadequacy of state funds.  These funds provide a kind of product warranty, 
akin to federal deposit insurance, that state regulators will provide adequate protection. 
Thus, as Bert Ely has explained, "if government wants to be in the business, for whatever 
reason, of regulating financial institutions, then it has no choice but to provide a warranty 
for the service that business supposedly provides to the general public."30 The problem is 
that as long as consumers demand a warranty, they are likely to insist on the stronger 
warranty the federal government can provide, particularly since the federal program may 
draw funds from already weak state funds. This is supported by the fact that non-federal 
deposit insurance almost completely disappeared in the wake of federal insurance.31   
Even apart from the federal government's deeper pocket, OFC might dominate the 
current state-based system simply because of the defects of state law under the current 
regime.  Because each state regulatory body currently has a monopoly over the regulation 
of insurance sold in that state, the states have had no incentive to compete to provide the 
most efficient regulation. A new federal competitor could start out by offering regulation 
that is superior to any state regulator. A few states might be able to quickly offer equal or 
superior regulation, but they would have to be significantly better in order to beat the 
deeper federal guaranty.  
Thus, the fact that the market might ultimately accept federal chartering over state 
law does not necessarily mean that it is the superior solution. The problem is that, due to 
the federal government's deeper pocket and its exclusive opportunity to offer 
jurisdictional choice, federal and state chartering will not be competing on an even 
playing field. Even if insurers could choose a single state license or a federal license, this 
would still not be a good market test because the states would still have to compete with a 
deep-pocketed federal regulator.  In any event, the need for a federal chartering option 
ultimately depends on the quality of state regulation under jurisdictional competition. 
                                                          
29 See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101 (1987); R. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing 
Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987). 
30 Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds after the Advent of Federal Insurance 
Chartering, in Wallison, supra note 1, 135, 137-38. 
31 Id. at 142. 
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Under our proposal outlined in Part III, state competition would provide meaningful 
competition and assurances of solvency.  This arguably eliminates the need to force the 
states into a one-sided competition with federal regulation and the solvency fund that 
bonds that regulation.  After considering the single-license alternative, we will return to 
the optional chartering approach.32  
In short, although OPM is being sold as a system that provides insurers with real 
choice, it does not actually deliver on this promise. OPM likely would lead to a system in 
which there is only one regulator, the federal government. If choice is good, as the 
proponents of OPM claim,33 policymakers should focus on designing a system that 
provides real choice.   True choice may or may not involve the choice of a federal 
charter.  What is clear is that the current OPM proposal does not involve true choice. 
C.   SMART ACT: MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS AND PREEMPTION 
The State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency (SMART) Act would 
effectively have the federal government establish minimum standards for many activities 
currently regulated by the states, including rates, policy forms, insurer and producer 
licensing, market conduct, surplus lines, reinsurance, solvency oversight, and 
receivership of insolvent insurers.  It would create a National-State Insurance 
Coordination Partnership. This agency would have seven commissioners – a chairman 
nominated by the states and appointed by the President, three federal commissioners and 
three state commissioners.  The SMART Partnership would have no direct regulatory 
authority, but a state's failure to follow NAIC model laws within three years of loss of 
regulatory authority.   
Although SMART is characterized as a federal-state “partnership” and is designed 
to make it appear that it is not a federal takeover, federal law would preempt state rules 
that fail to meet the federal minimum standards within specified periods. This constraint 
on the evolution of state regulation effectively relegates SMART to a federal takeover of 
regulation.  The basic problem is that the federal government cannot set minimum 
standards without ultimately coming to dominate the field.  Where does the federal role 
end and the state role begin? SMART's risk of federalization is even clearer than the risk 
of potential federalization of corporation law in the earlier handiwork of one of SMART's 
main legislative proponents – Representative Michael Oxley of Sarbanes-Oxley fame.  At 
least with the federal securities laws there is a boundary, albeit hazy, between disclosure 
and substantive regulation.  But with SMART, the federal government would be 
regulating precisely in the same way as the states.  The Supremacy Clause accordingly 
would not limit the federal reach.34  
                                                          
32 See infra subpart IV.C. 
33 See Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III, Creating Federal Insurance Regulation: A Zero-Based 
Approach, in Wallison, supra note 1, 161, 162 (“For proponents of the free market and the benefits of 
competition, the case for a federal regulatory alternative should be overwhelming and, in fact, for many 
years it has been overwhelming.”). 
34 With respect to the application of the Supremacy Clause to federal securities regulation, see 
Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 141. 
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D. INSURANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:  MANDATORY FEDERAL 
CHARTERING AND CREATION OF FEDERAL INSURANCE REGULATION 
The Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2003 (“ICPA”) would subject all 
multistate insurers to federal regulations.  The newly-formed Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, would regulate all lines of 
insurance.  All multistate insurers would be covered by a newly-formed National 
Insurance Guaranty Corporation.  The ICPA would, among other functions, provide for 
consumer protection function, repeal McCarran-Ferguson, and eliminate the insurance 
industry’s antitrust exemption.  This proposal discards the apparent efficiency goal of the 
above proposals for a naked political compromise – more consumer protection in 
exchange for lower regulatory compliance costs.   
E. COMPREHENSIVE RESTRUCTURING OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATION 
Professor Elizabeth Brown proposes a complete overhaul of federal financial 
services regulation.35  Professor Brown begins with a list of problems allegedly 
associated with all the proposals to federalize insurance including creating a race-to-the-
bottom between federal and state agencies competing for insurer chartering business; 
creating an uneven playing field between multistate and single state insurance companies; 
confusing consumers about which regulators are responsible for regulating particular 
companies; displacing state guaranty funds; and creating a massive new federal 
bureaucracy.36  Brown adds what she calls the "fatal flaw" of federal proposals – that 
they do "not make sense when the market for financial services is a continuum, not a 
series of discrete baskets.”37   
                                                          
Brown proposes to merge the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission into a super agency that would have 
regulatory authority over the insurance industry as well.  Brown argues that this new 
federal agency would reflect the realities of the financial services marketplace in which it 
is often difficult to distinguish where one product definition ends and another begins.38   
Although Brown correctly analyzes the fundamental changes in U.S. financial 
services markets that are merging previously discrete markets, her prescription for a 
consolidation of regulatory authority does not necessarily follow from this analysis. 
Brown’s proposal would in effect put federal regulation on steroids by having one federal 
agency regulate everything.  This would not only eliminate "horizontal" jurisdictional 
competition like the proposals discussed above, but also "vertical" competition among 
regulatory agencies. This proposal exhibits a great deal of confidence in a single set of 
35 See Brown, supra note 5. 
36 Id at 39. 
37 Id at 43. 
38 Id at 2 (“If the United States is going to federalize insurance, it should adopt a structure that 
recognizes the current realities of the financial services industry and not one that memorializes how the 
industry operated a decade ago.” ).  Brown models her proposal after the United Kingdom’s Financial 
Services Agency. 
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federal regulators to get it right and keep it right.  Unfortunately, there is no mechanism 
for correcting regulatory mistakes.39  
F.  SUMMARY 
Both theoretical considerations and a review of the current legislative proposals 
for insurance reform suggest several institutional approaches to regulatory reform in this 
area.  The first is the current state-based system, which has resulted in significant costs 
for insurers from opportunistic state regulators and courts and duplicative regulation.  A 
second option would be federalizing the system, which could fix the short-term problems 
but prevent needed competition and experimentation. A third approach is a state-federal 
partnership involving minimum federal standards.  However, putting the camel's nose of 
federal regulation under the tent likely will mean that the rest of the camel will soon 
follow – that is, full federalization of insurance regulation. Fourth, the federal 
government could become an optional chartering alternative.  But, again, we have shown 
how this "partnership" could lead to a "sole proprietorship" of federal regulation. The 
next Part presents a proposal for real competitive federalism in insurance.  Specifically, 
we suggest permitting insurers to choose a single state regulator that would govern their 
activities in all fifty states.   
III. THE SINGLE-LICENSE SOLUTION 
The states have had ample opportunities over the past half century to devise 
institutional structures that encourage the evolution of modern insurance regulation.  
Despite the current interest in federal legislation the state regulators seem content to 
make only marginal changes in the way they conduct their business.  As a result, there is 
a widespread consensus that there are serious problems with the current state-based 
regulatory system.  Yet, as discussed above, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the 
ability of federal regulators to get it right and keep it right.  The tension reflected in these 
observations suggests the need for a policy response that triggers the development of 
meaningful jurisdictional competition while reducing the likelihood of immediate federal 
domination that is likely under OFC. 
An alternative to the federal domination that is likely to occur under OFC or the 
other federalization of insurance proposals discussed above is to model federal insurance 
regulation after corporate chartering which takes advantage of the “genius” of 
jurisdictional competition.40  Under the regulatory federalism of the corporate chartering 
system, most internal governance is left to the chartering state, with a federal minimum 
standard that takes the form of disclosure regulation.  An analogous proposal for 
insurance regulation would allow an insurer to be chartered in a primary state of their 
choice, and then would be licensed to sell in any state provided the insurer met minimum 
                                                          
39 International competition in financial services could serve to constrain Brown’s federal 
regulatory behemoth (should the behemoth allow such competition), but the true cost of such centralization 
is that it would ruin any chance of taking advantage of the unique advantage that competitive federalism 
can provide to enhancing the competiveness of U.S. firms. 
40 See Romano, supra note 3. 
 14
Butler & Ribstein 
federal standards.41  At one point, this single-license proposal had the support of the 
insurance industry.42  
The single-license proposal is attractive because it captures both the static 
efficiency benefits that would be expected from moving to a single regulatory and the 
dynamic benefits of competitive regulatory federalism.  However, unlike the proposals 
discussed in Part II, there would be no overall federal regulation of insurance.  Insurers 
would get a single state charter under which they could do business everywhere. That 
state would both regulate solvency and provide the relevant guaranty fund.  With regard 
to solvency regulation, the single-license system would not be much different from the 
current system regarding insurer solvency regulation because states currently rely 
primarily on the solvency regulation of the chartering (domiciliary) state.43  There would 
be no disjunction between state-chartered and federally-chartered firms, or the moral 
hazard presented when the regulator and the keeper of the fund differ. 
The single-license system would not require creating new entities or massive new 
federal regulatory bodies. And because the federal government excluded itself from this 
regulatory area by McCarran-Ferguson, there is no federal regulatory apparatus to 
dismantle in order to institute effective state competition.  The single-license approach 
would, however, require federal legislation. The states have had 60 years since 
McCarran-Ferguson to evolve toward jurisdictional competition and have instead 
embraced a state cartel under NAIC. The statute might, for example, provide for federal 
preemption except where states enforce choice of law clauses, thereby preserving state 
autonomy as long as the states do not use their authority to disrupt interstate commerce.  
Similarly, a federal law was necessary to establish chartering competition for captive 
insurers.44 Also, by analogy, the National Banking Act established a state choice of law 
regime for interest rates.45 However, we emphasize that the federal law we have in mind 
is a federal choice-of-law rule rather than substantive regulation of insurance.  
Subpart A discusses the importance of opening the national market for single-
license firms by removing state regulatory impediments to entry and exit.  Subpart B 
discusses the important role that adjustments in the allocation of insurance tax revenues 
can play in spurring effective jurisdictional competition under the single-license 
approach.  Subpart C discusses our proposal for market-based federal minimum 
insolvency standards.  Subpart D presents the second qualification of constrained state 
mandatory consumer regulation. 
                                                          
41 See Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies: Options and Alternative for 
Transforming Insurance Regulation, Policy Brief, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, 
2006-PB-02 (March 2006). 
42 Id. 
43 See Wallison, supra note 1, at 10. 
44 See William J. Warfel, Insurance Regulatory Reform: An Evaluation of Options for Expanding 
the Role of the Federal Government (forthcoming CPCU eJournal 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=946457. 
45 See 12 U.S.C. § 85. 
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A.  REMOVING BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXIT 
The jurisdictional competition approach to insurance regulation could, in theory, 
evolve through reciprocal and multi-state agreements among states to recognize licenses 
granted in other states.  This has not happened, and it not obvious that it would ever 
happen with the provincial nature of current state-based insurance regulation.   
Accordingly, federal legislation mandating jurisdictional choice is necessary in 
order to fashion state regulation into a meaningful alternative to intrusive federal 
substantive regulation. Specifically, the federal statute should clearly authorize a state to 
charter insurance companies that can operate in all other states, subject only to non-
discriminatory solvency regulation that the non-chartering state imposes on insurers 
chartered in that state. This would enable consumers in every state to shop for insurance 
from companies regardless of where they are chartered based on price, quality and type 
of product.  
In order for meaningful jurisdictional competition to occur as to any aspect of 
insurance regulation, insurers must not only be able to select any chartering or regulating 
state that is attractive to them, but also to exit states that change their regulation. The 
main qualification on exit is that states need to be able to protect against a drain on 
potential contributions to the state guaranty fund.  Indeed, there are existing state 
associations, the National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds for P&C insurers and 
the National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guarantee Associations 
(NOLHGA), which protect against this risk.46 These institutions suggest that states can 
deal with this problem.  The concern is that states might go further and, for example, 
require insurers to pay a large exit fee if they wanted to reincorporate in another state. 
Firms can protect themselves to some extent by refusing to enter states that impose such 
restrictions.  The danger is that states will impose these restrictions for the first time after 
the insurer enters the state.47 To protect against this risk, any federal choice-of-law or 
chartering statute must include provisions designed to facilitate low-cost exit. 
B. TAX INCENTIVES FOR JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION 
A robust market for insurance regulation requires that states have an incentive to 
compete to provide such regulation. This incentive can be provided by properly 
allocating state tax revenue from insurance sales.48  The reallocation of insurance tax 
revenues could play an important role in spurring the type of jurisdictional competition 
proposed in this paper. However, it is unlikely that the states will agree on their own to 
such a reallocation because many – perhaps most – states will be net losers under this 
                                                          
46 See Ely, supra note 30 at 139. 
47 See Epstein, supra note 21. 
48 The need for this incentive indicates a further flaw in optional federal chartering. Proposed OFC 
would not affect the current allocation of state tax revenues on the basis insured's state of residence. The 
states accordingly would have little incentive to modify their insurance regulation in response to 
competition from federal chartering.  Supporters of OFC may have wanted to make their proposal more 
palatable by not making it look like a federal revenue grab.  And, to be sure, allocating revenue from 
federal chartering to the federal government would have that effect.  But the solution is to forego the 
federal regulator rather than adding one on a basis that would further weaken state competition.   
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system.  Accordingly, designing a federal jurisdictional choice statute requires 
considering the appropriate allocation of state tax revenues.   
The most straightforward allocation would be for the insurance tax revenue to go 
to the chartering state of the insurance company that sells the policy.  Because a 
substantial amount of revenue is at stake, it seems likely that several states would be 
willing to invest in creation of a regulatory environment that makes their state an 
attractive primary state.  Other states would have some incentive to keep up with 
regulatory changes in other states in order to avoid losing revenues.  
The problem with this straightforward proposal is that representatives from states 
that expect to lose revenues from the proposal would be likely to oppose it.  A 50-50 
allocation of the tax base (i.e., the premium paid) between the state of the insured and the 
state of the insurer accordingly might be politically more feasible.49  The states would 
determine their own tax rates. Under this approach, states have an incentive to compete 
because they lose tax revenue if their insurers either charter elsewhere or lose market 
share from operating under inefficient regulation. However, even the least competitive 
states would not lose all tax revenues because they would share the tax revenues earned 
from firms chartered in the dominant states.  
A potential problem with this approach is that a sudden shift to the new regime 
could benefit the states that are in position to gear up for competition most quickly. First-
mover advantages may stunt the development of vibrant jurisdictional competition. The 
problem might be mitigated by phasing in the allocation. For example, under a six-year 
phase-in, the split would go from 100-0, 90-10, 80-20, 70-30, 60-40, to 50-50 in the sixth 
year.  
It is difficult to predict the type of market that would evolve.  States with smaller 
markets might have a stronger incentive to specialize in the market for insurance 
regulation because their potential payoff is a larger share of total tax revenues than for 
smaller states. On the other hand, states where major insurance companies are 
headquartered may take the lead in order to capture an incumbent advantage. The 
jurisdictional competition under a single-license approach might lead to overall lower 
insurance rates as dominant states have an incentive to attract firms by reducing their 
chartering firms' operating costs. 
C. MARKET-BASED SOLVENCY STANDARDS 
As discussed in Part I, a key aspect of state insurance regulation is setting 
solvency standards that ensure that insurers can pay insured claims. Part II shows that the 
credibility of solvency regulation is bolstered to some extent by the "warranty" states 
effectively provide through their guaranty funds.  These funds help ensure that states will 
not force rates so low that they do not cover risks.  The problem here, and an impetus 
toward increase federalization, is the concern that state guaranty funds may not be 
                                                          
49 See David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure? U Illinois 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087830  Note that 
while the premia would be allocated, the states determine the tax rate on these premia.  
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adequate. Yet as discussed above,50 allowing optional federal chartering would 
effectively federalize solvency regulation through the creation of a federal guaranty fund.   
One approach to solving the problems of regulating solvency without excessive 
federalization is to use market-based solvency measures.  States could continue to 
regulate solvency, as they have done,51  under the law of the chartering state.  States that 
wanted to provide more protection for local consumers could do so by requiring both 
local chartered and out-of-state chartered firms to have a minimum market rating. 
Higher-rated firms would presumably charge more for equivalent coverage.  Each state's 
voters could decide how much risk they want to be allowed to take.  Moreover, to the 
extent that state rate regulation increases default risk, this would be reflected in ratings. 
This system would permit competition and experimentation.  Because it relies on the 
outputs of regulation – that is, the observed financial safety of companies – rather than 
less observable regulatory inputs, consumers have less need for a backup guaranty fund, 
whether provided at the state or federal level.   
An alternative mechanism that would provide safety comparable to state funds 
without federalization would be federal regulation that requires insurers to issue solvency 
bonds that default if the state guaranty fund fails.  The yield on these bonds would reflect 
the dispersed information available in the market rather than investigation by individual 
bond rating agencies. These information sensitive bonds would provide a market-based 
monitoring mechanism that would be independent of rating agencies and free from 
political influence.  A state's temptation to regulate rates or lower solvency standards 
would be disciplined by the increase in the cost of the bond for firms chartered in the 
state. Firms would avoid states whose charters increase the cost of the bond, thereby 
removing states' incentives to race to the bottom by under-regulating solvency. 
D. CHOICE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW  
The single-license solution ultimately provides consumer protection through 
nationwide rate competition, incentives and ability to offer new products, and increased 
information in national advertising. However, markets do not operate perfectly, and 
consumers may look to their home state insurance regulators for help.   
The consumer protection function of state insurance regulation is the biggest 
problem for state-based regulation where policies are sold in interstate markets.  A single 
license could enable out of state insurers to evade the consumer protection laws in states 
where insureds reside.  Imposing residence-state regulations raises the specter of burden 
insurers with multiple regulations as under current law. On the other hand, concerns 
about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, whether or not realistic,52 make a single-license 
model a political non-starter unless it gives states some opportunity to protect their 
residents.  This, of course, is also a problem with OFC proposals: the fact that the single 
regulator is the federal government will not eliminate calls for an additional layer of state 
protection.   
                                                          
50 See supra subpart IV.B. 
51 See supra text accompanying note 43. 
52 See infra subpart IV.A. 
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One possible approach to the risk of laxity would be to protect consumers and 
preserve state regulatory authority through a federal law that permits single-license 
companies to be regulated under the law of their chartering jurisdiction but only if they 
clearly disclose to consumers whether they comply with local state law. Consumers could 
then choose between "state approved" and "state unapproved" systems.  This compromise 
is unlikely to assuage proponents of state regulation, who will argue that the whole point 
of state regulation is to protect consumers who may not be able fully to evaluate the risks 
of regulatory competition. Moreover, this system would add little to what the market 
could do on its own – i.e., disclosure of private industry certification, as by some NAIC-
type body.  Indeed, the applicable state standards probably would be written by the 
NAIC.  
A superior solution would be a federal contractual choice of law statute. Under 
our proposed statute, the state law designated in the insurance policy would apply to all 
matters concerning the application and validity of the insurance policy.  The insurer could 
designate the consumer protection law of any state, including but not limited to the 
chartering (licensing) state.  However, the regulation of a state in which the policies are 
sold could trump the designated state law if the regulating state explicitly prohibits 
enforcement of the choice-of-law clause.53  
This proposal builds on the positive structure of jurisdictional competition and 
choice of law as observed in many areas of the law.54  Even in the absence of a federal 
push, the states have broadly enforced contractual choice of law.  For example, the 
development of the internal affairs doctrine in corporate law proceeded spontaneously 
and without any special help from federal law.55  States enforce contractual choice of law 
even though this tends to undercut their own regulatory efforts because if they do not do 
so firms can take their business to other states or turn to Congress for help.  The problem 
with this system is that it tends to work slowly and imperfectly.  Our proposed federal 
statute will give the system a nudge in the general direction it is likely to go on its own.  
The proposed statute's general default rule calling for enforcement of choice-of-
law clauses would enable companies to choose the single law that best suits their business 
and to have that law govern its policies wherever they do business. Because the chosen 
law need not be the chartering state, insurers can "unbundle" their regulatory preferences 
and charter in states that are good at financial regulation while choosing to have their 
policies governed by states that are good at consumer regulation.  This addresses the 
problem of national firms facing 51 different regulatory regimes.  The likely result is that 
one or a couple of jurisdictions will have the incentive to invest in developing efficient 
regulatory regimes – perhaps Connecticut, which already has a significant investment in 
regulating insurers and hedge funds.  
                                                          
53 For a discussion of a similar proposal for a general federal contractual choice of law statute, see 
O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 20, Ch. 11.   
54 See, generally, id.  
55 See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2007 Ill. L. 
Rev. 661. 
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The proposed approach also addresses consumer groups' concerns with a potential 
regulatory race to the bottom by permitting state override of contractual choice of law.  
At the same time, our approach includes several significant conditions designed to protect 
insurers from excessively burdensome multiple state regulation: (1) any state override 
must be by the legislature; (2) the override only applies if enacted in a state where 
policies are sold; (3) the override is effective only as to policies sold after the legislation 
is enacted; and (4) the insurer has a clear right to exit the state.56   
The requirement of enactment by the legislature serves two purposes. First, it 
gives insurers certainty and ex ante predictability.  Insurers will know before selling 
policies in a particular state whether their chosen law will apply, rather than having to 
wait for a judicial determination of the effect of the state on choice-of-law contracts 
under vague choice-of-law rules.57  Second, it provides an implicit political check on 
state incentives to override contractual choice of law. An interest group that seeks to 
regulate insurance policies in the state must bear the burden of getting political support 
not only for the regulation itself, but also for invalidating attempted avoidance of the 
regulation through contractual choice of law.  This forces the full effect of the law to the 
enactment stage rather than deferring some of it to the judicial level when courts 
adjudicate validity of choice-of-law clauses.   
The stipulations that state override applies only to policies sold in the regulating 
state after the passage of the regulation and ensuring insurers' right to exit maximize 
insurers' ability to avoid oppressive state laws. This raises the political ante for pro-
regulatory interest groups because exit can impose costs on local consumers and others. 
Legislatures would have to take into account at the time of enactment lobbying not only 
by the insurers that would be subject to the regulation, but also by consumers and others 
who would be hurt if firms left the state in order to avoid the law.  
In general, all of the relevant parties may be willing to accept the equilibrium that 
is likely to prevail under our proposed law.  States may be able to live with a regime in 
which some can compete to become dominant regulators while others retain a limited 
ability to impose their own rules.   Consumer groups retain the ability they currently have 
to lobby at the state level.  And multi-state insurers would face a reduced risk of multiple 
state regulations that would probably approximate what they should expect to have to 
deal with under optional federal chartering. 
IV. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL REGULATION 
The single-license proposal outlined in Part III would preserve the central state 
role in insurance regulation, while addressing the problem under current state law of 
exposing insurers to multiple regulators. The federal government's main role in our 
approach is as a sort of traffic cop – that is, enacting the necessary structural groundwork 
to ensure that states enforce the sole licensing state's law except in specific circumstances 
specified in the statute.  
                                                          
56  On the problems caused by exit restrictions, see Epstein, supra note 21, and the recent history 
of Mississippi, supra note 22. 
57 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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This Part considers what, if any, additional role the federal government should 
play in enacting and enforcing substantive regulation.  Subpart A discusses the main 
arguments for federal regulation. Subparts B and C discuss specific types of federal 
regulation that might respond to these concerns.  We emphasize the problem of designing 
such regulation to deal with the potential problems of single licensing without 
undermining the advantages of regulatory competition. 
A.  THE CASE FOR FEDERAL LAW  
Critics of our single-license approach are likely to raise two general types of 
objections.  First, consumer advocates may argue that legislators and regulators would try 
to attract insurers, and the tax revenues they bring with them, by promising not to 
regulate strictly. This "race-to-the-bottom" would destabilize insurance guaranty funds 
and put consumers at risk.  Second, insurers may fear that our proposed qualifications on 
single licensing would leave the door open for continued aggressive regulation by 
multiple state regulators.  The following sections address these issues.  
1.  Race to the bottom 
The appropriate starting point in addressing the race-to-the-bottom argument is 
whether the risk of such a race is greater for insurance regulation than for corporate law, 
which provides the model for state chartering.  Corporate legal scholarship has generally 
supported the conclusion that the competition between the chartering states benefits 
shareholders.58 Do the same considerations apply to single-state licensing of insurers?  
One might argue that the corporate internal affairs doctrine (IAD), which is the 
basis of state competition in corporate law, is stable precisely because it does not attempt 
to invade traditional areas of state regulation.59  The IAD is fairly narrow, and excludes 
controversial aspects of regulating corporations, such as securities fraud and disclosure, 
antitrust law, bankruptcy and myriad types of corporate conduct, for treatment by federal 
law or state law that is not within the IAD. The corporate law market relates only to 
substantive corporate governance.  In public corporations these are standard rules which 
are priced fairly accurately in efficient stock markets, while in closely held firms they are 
subject to negotiation by engaged business people.  The IAD's triviality may partly 
explain why Congress has not preempted the field, though it clearly has the power to do 
so.  
Insurance regulation arguably bears a closer resemblance to traditional consumer 
protection law, and therefore is likely to trigger much stronger objections to applying 
firms' chosen state law. There are, however, reasons for skepticism about the fear of race 
to the bottom in insurance regulation through primary state regulation.  Even in such 
areas as environmental regulation, there are theoretical and empirical questions about the 
                                                          
58 See Romano, supra note 3; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The 
Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 
(1980). 
59 Ribstein & O'Hara, infra note 55. 
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validity of the race to the bottom story.60  With respect to insurance regulation, as already 
noted,61 even unsophisticated consumers are protected by robust markets.  
Moreover, state regulation in the absence of choice of law has not necessarily 
protected consumers. For example, it took Eliot Spitzer to react to existing problems of 
broker contingent compensation.  Some would say that Spitzer overreacted, but the fact 
would remain that there was a problem that dispersed state regulators had not 
addressed.62 By contrast, recognizing a clear default rule of enforcement of choice of 
licensing jurisdiction is likely to induce some states to invest in developing a reputation 
for prudent insurance regulation.  This may result in greater consumer protection than 
under the current regime of dispersed regulators, thereby reducing states' incentives to 
override contractual choice. For example, Vermont has maintained a dominant role as the 
jurisdiction of choice for captive insurers, not through laxity, but in part by maintaining a 
reputation for stringent financial integrity regulation that has kept the liquidation rate of 
Vermont associations lower than that of other states.63 
Thus, single-state licensing not only promises to reduce regulatory costs, but also 
to produce more efficient and effective regulation. But despite these arguments against 
the "race-to-the-bottom" objection, we have attempted to mitigate this risk through 
federal market-based constraints on solvency regulation64 and by allowing for limited 
state override of the licensing state to protect consumers.65 Particularly with these 
safeguards in place, extensive federal regulation of insurance is unnecessary.  The modest 
proposals in subparts B and C are intended to fill any remaining gap in protection without 
opening the door too wide for federal regulation to supplant state competition. 
2. Excessive state regulation 
Insurers may object that the limitations we propose on state competition raise the 
problem that aggressive state legislatures may take advantage of their power to override 
the single license and impose multiple regulatory burdens on insurers. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that would-be regulators are subject to the significant risk that 
insurers will respond by lobbying Congress for a federal insurance law that would 
preempt state regulation. State regulation, particularly of a national industry like 
insurance, always exists in the shadow of potential federal law.  To minimize the risk of 
being supplanted by federal law, states may either refrain from regulating except to fight 
                                                          
60 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1210 (1992); Henry N. Butler 
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377 (2005). 
61 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
62 See Warfel, supra note 44; Scott, supra note 6 (discussing problems with dispersed rate 
regulation).  
63 See Warfel, supra note 44. 
64 See supra subpart III.C. 
65 See supra subpart III.D. 
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the clearest abuses, or opt for uniform state laws through the NAIC that at least reduce 
the risk of duplicative and opportunistic regulation.  
Given the persisting risk of federal regulation, our single-license approach could 
be viewed as a kind of trial run for state law.  The states have been the exclusive 
insurance regulators for sixty years.  The problems of state regulation have led to loud 
calls for federal regulation from both consumers and insurers.  We argue in this paper for 
rehabilitation of state regulation by opening this regulation to jurisdictional competition. 
But if this rehabilitation does not work, state regulators understand that the calls for 
federal regulation may become politically irresistible. 
Insurers may respond that the political costs and risks of dismantling the state 
competition regime diminish any disciplinary effect of potential federal regulation. This 
suggests that it may be appropriate to establish a federal regulatory structure that would 
be ready to step in if needed without having to do a full-fledged overhaul of the existing 
regime.  The proposals in subparts B and C, below, might serve this function in addition 
to addressing potential for a race-to-the-bottom.  
B.  OFFICE OF NATIONAL INSURANCE 
Secretary Paulson's Treasury Plan calls for the creation of a specialized federal 
office to monitor insurance markets.66  The proposed Office of National Insurance could 
play an important role in our single-license scheme of collecting, disseminating, and 
analyzing information about the effectiveness of state jurisdictional competition. The data 
would indicate if state regulation has been too lax or if states are imposing excessive 
regulatory burdens on insurers.   
In order to increase the disciplinary effect of the federal insurance office, the 
office could be empowered to impose specified types of regulation and preempt state law 
if it makes the requisite findings.  This would move the federal preemption threat from 
the background to a foreground concern for lax or aggressive state regulators.  This is 
comparable to the Securities and Exchange Commission's power to supplement or 
preempt state corporate law under its general authority to regulate national securities 
markets.   
The obvious problem with establishing this federal mechanism is the pervasive 
concern that such an agency will succumb to the well-known bureaucratic tendencies to 
expand its mission and authority.  In order to deal with this problem, the agency's power 
needs to be carefully circumscribed and the conditions of its intervention need to be 
described as precisely as possible.   
The national insurance office would have the additional function and benefit of 
better enabling U.S. insurers to enter foreign markets. Critics of state law have suggested 
that U.S. insurers are at a competitive disadvantage in attempting to enter foreign markets 
because it is hard for dispersed state regulators to offer reciprocal privileges to foreign 
insurers entering the U.S. This problem would be alleviated under our approach because 
the foreign insurer would only have to obtain a single license.  However, the problem 
would continue to some extent because no one regulator would represent U.S. interests in 
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international negotiations.  The proposed national insurance office could not only be a 
way to clarify the state licensing alternatives available to foreign entrants, but a 
mechanism for negotiating international treaties.  
C.  TRULY OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING 
Lax or aggressive state regulators might be disciplined not only by the threat of 
federal regulation, but also by offering insurers the additional choice of a federal charter.  
As discussed in subpart II.B., the current proposal for optional federal chartering does not 
offer a true option for several reasons:  insurers' only other choice is continued exposure 
to regulation in each state in which they sell insurance; the federal government is likely to 
be able to back up its regulation with a better solvency guaranty fund than any state 
regulator; and the federal government would be able to quickly offer higher quality 
regulation than what any state has developed under the weak incentives of the current 
state regulatory system. The single-license proposal would give states a competitive 
incentive to offer superior regulation, thereby arguably making optional federal 
chartering unnecessary.  
Although optional federal chartering may be unnecessary under a favorable view 
of state competition, it offers a potential alternative for insurers or consumer groups that 
object to our single-license alternative.  It is important to emphasize that we are referring 
to truly optional chartering, in which the federal charter competes on a level playing field 
with state chartering.   
Leveling the playing field would involve not only offering the possibility of a 
single state license, but also giving the states the opportunity to develop viable regulation 
under competition before the federal government can enter the competition. Making the 
federal option available immediately may stifle the development of jurisdictional 
competition by the states.  Accordingly, we suggest making the federal charter available 
after a reasonable transition period of five years or so.  An alternative would be to 
empower the national insurance office proposed above to recommend the desirability or 
need for a federal charter option after five years experience under our single-license 
approach.  
Truly optional federal chartering could be designed to address both of the 
problems with single licensing identified in subpart A.  Federal chartering might deal 
with the problem of multiple state regulators overriding chartering state law by providing 
that the federal charter preempts state consumer protection regulation.  Preemption is 
arguably justified on the basis that the federal government has less revenue incentive than 
a small state to race-to-the-bottom to attract chartering business.   
Federal chartering also could address state laxity by providing a superior guaranty 
fund as a "warranty" to back solvency and rate regulation.  This would not only protect 
consumers, but also could attract chartering business from insurers.  Insurers could decide 
whether they want the most efficient state regulation that has developed under single-
license competition, backed by the market-based solvency protection,67 or to offer their 
customers the security of a federal guaranty, presumably at a higher price.  
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It is important, however, to keep in mind the caveat that the federal option always 
has the potential to overwhelm even efficient state competitors, resulting in a non-
competitive system with a single federal regulator.68  Because of this danger, federal 
chartering should be made available only if there is a preliminary finding by Congress or 
the national insurance office that there are defects in the competitive single-license state 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
All proposals to federalize insurance regulation – whether through mandatory or 
optional federal laws – create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal 
government.  Monopoly national regulation of the insurance industry should be viewed 
with skepticism by both industry and consumers.  Insurance carriers could be subject to 
rent extraction by the federal regulator, while consumers should be concerned about 
industry capture of the centralized regulatory agency. This article proposes a state-based 
regime that both protects insurers from the worst effects of multiple regulators and 
creates a real opportunity for jurisdictional competition and experimentation. To be sure, 
a state-based regime is not perfect. But a single federal regime also has serious potential 
drawbacks, particularly including the absence of a mechanism to correct its errors. We 
have proposed a set of checks and balances to help protect against the potential 
malfunctioning of the state system.  There is no guarantee that state competition is a 
panacea.  But given the strong potential benefits of state competition under our single-
license approach, it is certainly worth trying before scrapping state law in favor of a 
single federal regulator. 
68 For a discussion of the Canadian experience with an optional federal corporation law, see 
Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?  The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 
MCGILL L.J. 130 (1991) (noting dysfunctions that can arise in competition between federal and state 
chartering jurisdictions).  
